The person on the street tends to think of the Great War in terms of the Somme, or the war poets, or even the BBC's Blackadder comedy series. However, these impressions tend to focus on issues relating to the horrors of war, or the conditions endured by the soldiers. In many respects, the Great War has had many of us uncharacteristically focusing on the 'what?' of history, more than the more usual issues like 'why?', or 'to what extent?'.
Military historians have been busy changing this emphasis. In recent work they have increasingly focused on the final three months of the war. This phase from 8 August to 11 November 1918 is known as 'The 100 Days'.
During this period the Entente powers, led primarily by the British Empire forces, forced the German army to retreat almost to the borders of Germany. The question which excites these historians, however, is what made this possible. Were the victories of the 100 Days the result of inspired military tactics and weapons, or are the real victors the workers and managers in Britain's factories?
The 100 Days, 1918
The 100 days began with the British offensive at Amiens on 8 August 1918. There were a number of reasons why this attack was successful. The first reason was that the attack was spearheaded by the Canadian Corps, which was the best corps in the allied armies. The Canadians had the advantage that, unlike a normal corps, they were kept together. Normally a corps was simply an administrative unit consisting of a Lieutenant-General and his staff. This officer and his staff would then be allocated a number of divisions in order to carry out a task such as an attack. Since the Canadian Government was paying for the Canadian Corps, it was able to apply political pressure on London to allow the four Canadian divisions to work together. The Canadians had little respect for some of the British commanders, and the growing shortage of men and their spectacular success at Vimy Ridge in April 1917 confirmed the wisdom of letting them operate together. To deceive the Germans, the Canadians were brought into the line gradually and behind a thin screen of Australians, who were left in the line until only hours before the attack. The idea was that if the Germans raided the British lines they would find the Australians not the Canadians. To aid this deception, two battalions of the Canadian Corps were left in Flanders broadcasting radio messages. As intended, this convinced the Germans the attack would fall in the North.
However, Amiens is not simply a Canadian story. This battle is also remembered for the largest deployment of tanks in the war. In a recent work entitled The First World War, John Keegan appears to conclude that tanks were the decisive weapon. Historian JP Harris takes a slightly different approach. Harris points out that 430 tanks actually took part in the battle on 8 August. To Harris, the importance of this is that it demonstrates Britain's capacity to produce war materials. He is less convinced about the extent to which tanks were the decisive weapons. He points out that on 9 August there were only 155 tanks available. This was because tanks were very vulnerable to shell fire. They were large and slow moving, so German gunners could, assuming they kept cool heads, fire 'over open sights' at the tanks. This means that they fired at the tanks when they could see them. Field guns could pierce tank armour, and damage to the tracks would immobilise the tank. German machine gunners used special ammunition which could pierce tanks. Tanks were also hampered by mechanical breakdown and crew fatigue. The crews had to work in temperatures exceeding 100 degrees. Heat and the fumes from firing the gun, as well as fumes leaking from damaged fuel lines, caused severe nausea and dizziness even for those men who survived a day in action.
Artillery was not a new weapon like the tank, but it was used in new ways and with new levels of accuracy and imagination. At Amiens and at other major battles such as the Hindenburg Line (29 September 1918) the British artillery plan was sophisticated and extremely successful.
- There were the standard features such as a creeping barrage consisting of a mixture of smoke (to hide the advancing infantry) and high explosive (to destroy defences).
- There was heavy counter-battery activity (fire directed on to German batteries of guns) using gas.
- Key points where defenders were sheltering were identified and targeted to prevent close support troops reaching the front line.
In total the assault on the Hindenburg Line was supported by more than a million shells being fired in a 36-hour period - as many shells as were fired in the week-long preliminary bombardment on the Somme in 1916. Furthermore, heavy machine guns were used to provide an additional curtain of fire to protect the advancing British infantry. The central assault by the British 46th Division, commanded by Major-General Boyd, also benefited from ingenuity and luck. Because the Division had to cross a canal, the men were issued with lifebelts taken from the cross-channel ferries. This brainwave (along with an early morning mist) helped to minimise early casualties. The Division also used the leapfrog system which had become standard procedure in the British Army, whereby units leading the assault consolidated their hold on the first objective whilst other units passed through them to carry on the assault. This method helped to maintain momentum, since the leading units did not get worn down as they advanced.
A further feature of the battles of the 100 Days was the use of air power. Before Amiens aircraft were used to provide accurate spotters for the artillery and to prevent hostile aircraft from observing the British preparations. For the battle itself, aircraft were deployed in these traditional roles, but also in 'interdiction'. This involved machine gunning and strafing ground forces to disrupt the flow of German reinforcements to the front.
Amiens was not an isolated example of innovative ideas being applied in the 100 Days. In a small battle at Andigny Les Fermes on 17 October 1918, the British artillery used a very sophisticated barrage to give support to the infantry as they advanced through a wood. In effect the barrage created a triangular box.
The success at Amiens, the Hindenburg Line and Andigny supports the view of Professor Simpkins' (historian at the Imperial War
Museum in London) that by late 1918 the British Army could shell
their way into any position. Since Ludendorff advised the Kaiser to make peace at the end of September 1918, just as the British approached the Hindenburg Line, it is reasonable to argue that the War was won on the Western Front. Literature students will remember that Wilfred Owen was killed on 4 November 1918, as the British sought to ensure that the German negotiators would realise there was no alternative to surrender.
The Home Front
If we agree that the Entente powers won because the British had developed a decisive superiority in weapons technology and its application, then it is still necessary to explain why Germany failed to match this. After all, Germany was on the brink of overtaking Britain by 1914, and was already producing more steel than Britain. Arguably Germany was already leading Britain in the development of the electrical and chemical industries. It has been estimated that Germany's domestic growth after 1900 averaged 1.5 per cent whereas Britain's was 0.5 per cent.
A key issue therefore is the British naval blockade and its impact upon the economies of Germany and her allies. Winston Churchill's decision to maintain the fleet in readiness after the annual manoeuvres (major naval training exercises) gave the Royal Navy an advantage in immediately being ready to impound vessels from hostile nations. German historians such as Herwig point out that Britain broke international law by maintaining a 'distant blockade' and yet demanding the same rights as international law permitted for a 'close blockade'. Many Germans died because of the 'hunger blockade' but few wars have been won by those who follow all the rules! These judgements are important in correcting the idea that the Germans were responsible for all the nasty 'underhand' means of fighting, such as submarines and gas.
From August 1914, the Royal Navy was able to deny Germany the use of 64 per cent of her merchant fleet. This led to a massive drop in her overseas trade from $5.9 billion in 1913 to $800 million by 1917. Some of Germany's trade passed through neutral countries such as the Netherlands. However, even this was reduced when the British extended their powers of search to the Netherlands. By 1918 very little fodder and no fresh fruit was reaching the Dutch. This in turn reduced the flow of vital foodstuffs to Germany. The effects of the blockade could be clearly seen and felt in Germany. The Royal Navy's success in cutting supplies of fodder led German farmers to feed pigs with grain and potatoes. This was illegal because these foods were needed for humans, so the German Government ordered the wholesale slaughter of pigs in the Spring of 1915. This led to the killing of a third of all the pigs in Germany. This meant it became hard to get fresh pork so prices shot up, which was - of course - very unpopular. Therefore the Government set maximum prices for 700 basic foods. The farmers were very unhappy about this so they cut supplies. In response the German Government had to introduce meat rationing, having already introduced bread rationing in February 1915. It is estimated that there were 300,000 'additional' deaths (from conditions related to malnutrition) amongst the civilian population in Germany during the period 1914 - 1918. It is very difficult to predict just how population would have changed without the war but this figure provides a guide to the impact of the blockade. It also goes a long way towards explaining why the German revolution of 1918 was focused in the cities, where food shortages would be most acute since farmers could always withhold food from the markets.
The British blockade was also very effective in cutting off supplies of nitrates, which were vital for the production of both explosives and fertilisers. Before 1914 Germany relied upon importing six million tons of fodder and two million tons of fertilisers. The shortage of artificial fertilisers was made worse by labour shortages as more men were called to fight. The wheat harvest, for example, fell by nearly 50 per cent during the war. The shortage of cotton due to the blockade led the German Government to forbid the slaughter of sheep to increase the supply of wool. This of course decreased the food supply. Milk production fell by more than 60 per cent and was restricted to children under two years. Approximately 250,000 14 - 17 year olds went to work in war related industries, as inflation put pressure on family incomes and school hours were reduced as teachers were drafted. Metal industries, such as shell production, had a typical working day of 15 hours and a working week averaged at least 60 hours per week. Workers then came home to a ration including margarine made from crushed beetles and one egg if available. The meat ration for an adult for the entire week in 1916 was the equivalent of two quarter pound burgers in a modern fast food restaurant. The ration was often reduced and sometimes 'meatless weeks' were declared to make supplies last longer.
Meanwhile, the German Army was given priority. In 1916 48,700 cows were slaughtered for civilian consumption, whereas the Army received 147,000 per month. Even so, by 1918 the German Army was receiving a lot of cabbage soup and its troops were reported to have stopped after capturing British trenches because the food they found was so good. One of the reasons for this contrast is the effectiveness of British Government action. As the U- Boat campaign cut supplies in 1917 the British Government passed the Corn Production Act. This Act guaranteed minimum prices for wheat and oats until at least 1922. Past experience had taught farmers that large scale production during war often caused food prices to drop disastrously (because there was too much of it around). The Corn Production Act gave British farmers the incentive to mechanise production because they knew prices would not be allowed to fall below a certain limit. To increase output, 7.5 million acres were converted from pasture to crops such as wheat and potatoes. By 1918 the total output of crops like these and peas and beans had risen by four million tons compared with 1914, equivalent to Britain being able to feed herself for 30 days more per year.
Germany's difficulties were made worse by the weakness of her main ally, Austria - Hungary. The constant requests for aid from Germany made by Conrad, commander of the Austro-Hungarian forces, contrast sharply with the USA, which was able to supply the Entente powers with raw materials whilst she was a non-combatant nation and with materials and men after entering the war in April 1917.
It is important to remember that the American contribution to winning the war was not as great as American or French public opinion was led to believe. The French were keen to applaud the Americans because it covered their embarrassment at being dependant upon Britain and because they wanted the Americans to guarantee their future security. This was a reasonable strategy in 1919 because the French knew that Britain would never be prepared to maintain a force in Europe large enough to deter Germany. American forces were slow to arrive in Europe and even slower to reach the Western Front. The Americans did play a part in the Second Battle of the Marne and their attack on the St Mihiel salient helped to blunt the German offensives of 1918, but their biggest contribution was potential rather than actual. In 1918 the Americans were learning the skills in practical warfare that others had by now acquired. The key for the Germans was that in 1919 these units, often numerically double the strength of their British or French equivalents, would be able to repeat the British successes of late 1918 and therefore the war would very quickly be being fought in Germany.
The Americans could draw upon British industry to supply it with the artillery it would need in France. By 1918, the British Government was spending £562 million just on munitions compared with £163,361 million on the armed forces and munitions in 1914-15. This was made possible by the work of Lloyd George and others in increasing production. By July 1916 ammunition produced for the 18-pounder field gun had risen by 1,700 per cent. Between August 1914 and April 1915 the BEF received two million shells - approximately 250,000 shells per month - but between April 1915 and the end of the war it received 185 million shells - approximately 4,300,000 per month. Since this change took time it is easy to see how abundant supplies were by 1918.
Further reading
Gerard De Groot, Blighty - British Society in the Era of the Great War. This book explores the role of women in helping Britain achieve its economic victory (chapters five and six).
J P Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks. Chapters four and five provide an excellent summary on the military aspects of warfare in 1918 and is therefore ideal for answering such questions as to why the allies won in 1918.
Holger Herwig, The First World War - Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918. This book can help you to develop your understanding of how Austria - Hungary helped to drag Germany down.
John Keegan, The First World War.
Professor Simpkins, Kitchener's Army, published by Manchester University
Press.
Potentially useful websites:
